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Abstract
Many companies pay their executives using inside debt, such as pensions and deferred
compensation. Though these instruments are widely used, their valuation and incentive
effects for managers have been almost entirely overlooked by prior research. CEO com-
pensation in most firms exhibits a balance between debt- and equity-based incentives, and
the balance systematically shifts away from equity and toward debt as CEOs grow older.
CEOs with high debt-based incentives manage their firms conservatively to reduce default
risk. Pension plan compensation strongly influences patterns of CEO turnover and CEO
cash compensation.
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1 Introduction
In the nearly-three decades since the publication of Jensen and Meckling (1976), a vast aca-
demic literature has emerged on executive compensation. A predominant focus of this literature
has been equity-based compensation, paid in the form of restricted stock, stock options, and
other instruments whose value is tied to future equity returns. Empirically, the growing role
of equity-based compensation has been widely documented as part of research examining pay-
versus-performance for corporate executives. On the theoretical front, the literature has sought
both a justification for linking managerial pay to equity and the potential consequences of such
a link for managerial incentives and other issues. Implicit in virtually all of this research is that
managerial compensation consists of only two components: cash and equity-linked instruments.
For example, Dewatripont and Tirole (1994) ask
Why are managers’ monetary incentives . . . traditionally correlated with the value of
equity rather than the value of debt? That is, why does compensation meant to
maximize firm value have managers paid in stocks rather than as a function of firm
value?
Overlooked almost entirely is the widespread practice of paying top managers with debt. It is
common for executives in the U.S. to work in exchange for promises from their firms to pay them
fixed sums of cash in the future. The most common form of these intra-company IOUs (“inside
debt” in the language of Jensen and Meckling, 1976) are defined-benefit pensions and deferred
compensation. As we document in this paper, the amounts involved are significant.
The implications of substantial inside debt holdings by executives are numerous. By affecting
both the overall level of compensation and its composition, inside debt alters managerial incentives
in many directions. It should, for example, have an impact on the size of the firm’s payouts, the
composition of these payouts (dividends versus share repurchases), the firm’s cost of debt and its
capital structure, the choice of new securities to be issued (debt versus equity), project choice,
capital expenditure, and the incentive to pursue diversifying mergers, among many other things.
From a theoretical standpoint, it also raises the question of when and whether such debt-holding
could be part of an optimal compensation package.
This paper takes a first, largely empirical, step in exploring the nature and implications of
debt-based compensation for CEOs of large U.S. companies. Because disclosure for deferred
compensation plans is limited, out of necessity most of our analysis focuses on CEO pension
plans. (Even on pensions, information is not readily available as we explain later in the paper.)
We begin with an example that illustrates and motivates the material to come.
1
A Case Study: Jack Welch of General Electric
Table I presents data about the annual evolution of the pension and deferred compensation of
perhaps the most famous CEO in American business, John F. Welch Jr. of General Electric Co.
Data appears annually for the last nine years of Welch’s career, along with information about his
direct compensation and equity ownership.
Welch’s debt-based compensation was a significant part of his overall pay. Incremental yearly
increases in his pension entitlement, when valued using standard actuarial methods, ranged as
high as $24.8 million during the period shown, exceeding his cash salary and bonus compensation
in each of his last five working years. By the time Welch retired, General Electric owed him $170
million between the present value of his pension and his deferred compensation.
The growth of Welch’s pension value accelerated in his final years of office. This pattern
is directly linked to the service-based formula underlying most CEO pensions. It provides clear
incentives for CEOs to remain working until the minimum age for pension payout and also to
manage the firm in their latter years in a way that preserves the value of the pension. In particular,
one might expect CEOs to reduce firm risk as they accumulate seniority and their pension values
grow.
Welch’s cash compensation also grew substantially after he turned 60 in 1995, and he received
a very large equity award as well in that year. General Electric permits retirement at age 60 with
full pension benefits. To provide incentives to managers to keep working beyond that age, one
would expect the company to increase compensation in order to make them whole for the pension
benefits they sacrificed by not retiring. This appears to have happened with Welch.
Welch’s “debt-equity ratio”—the ratio of his inside debt holding to his equity (stock and
option) holding—ranged between 0.07 and 0.27 during the period shown, which was well below
the company’s overall debt/equity ratio during the same period. Having the CEO invested in
both debt and equity claims against the company provides a mechanism for mitigating the agency
costs of debt (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), but very large CEO holdings of inside debt may lead
to an overly conservative management style. It is possible that the large equity awards Welch
received in his final years in office were partly intended to counteract the incentives for conservative
management that would otherwise have arisen from his pension.
Welch’s pension structure and holdings of inside debt are not exceptional.1 This paper inves-
1The level of Welch’s compensation is not typical of most CEOs—his pension is by far the highest in our
sample—but the balance between his inside debt and equity holdings and their evolution over time are quite
typical among CEOs. Probably the most valuable pensions among active CEOs today are held by Lee R. Raymond
of Exxon Mobil Corp. and Edward E. Whitacre Jr. of SBC communications Inc., each of whose pension has a
fair actuarial present value betwen $50 and $60 million. Raymond also holds about $350 million worth of shares
and options in his company, while Whitacre’s equity holdings are considerably lower, not too far from parity with
his pension value.
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tigates CEO pensions in the U.S. and finds that these patterns of are present more generally in
the data. The rest of this section elaborates.
This Paper’s Contribution
Our sample involves CEO compensation for 237 Fortune 500 companies over a seven-year period
between 1996 and 2002. Following a discussion of the related literature in Section 2, Section 3
describes our data set and the common rules used to determine CEO pensions.
Our analysis opens in Section 4 by highlighting of the importance of pensions in CEOs’
compensation structure. Of the many features described here, two bear particular emphasis.
First, we show that increases in the fair value of pensions constitute a significant component of
overall compensation for many CEOs. For example, for the CEOs in the age group 61-65 in our
sample, the pension component of overall compensation is on average 30% larger than the base
salary and is 21% of the size of equity compensation. Second, the importance of the pension
component of compensation increases monotonically with age. As a consequence, the balance
between debt and equity incentives for CEOs shifts in a clear pattern away from equity and toward
debt as they grow older. For instance, only 7% of the CEOs in our sample who are aged between
51 and 55 have debt-equity ratios exceeding their company’s debt-equity ratios, but for CEOs in
the age group 61-65, this rises to 22%.
In light of the importance of the pension component of executive compensation, we find
it a bit surprising that companies in the U.S. (unlike their U.K. counterparts) are not required
to report pension values explicitly and in greater detail. We comment further on this issue in
Section 4.
Section 5 looks to identify important variables that determine or correlate with (a) the pension
component of compensation, and (b) the CEO’s ratio of debt-to-equity holdings. We consider a
large set of variables suggested by contracting theory and intuition, including the firm’s leverage,
its growth opportunities, tax status, liquidity position, and several others. We find that the firm’s
leverage is positively related to the ratio of debt-to-equity compensation as expected. The CEO’s
years of tenure with the firm also exhibits a positive association with both the pension value and
ratio of debt to equity pay. Surprisingly, few other company variables appear to influence the
CEO’s debt-equity ratio.
Section 6 turns to a topic that has received considerable coverage in the compensation litera-
ture: CEO turnover (e.g., Warner, Watts, and Wruck (1988) and Huson, Malatesta, and Parrino
(2004)). We examine the role of the payout schedule for pensions in this context and find that
it acts as a critical determinant of turnover: Holding constant age and other variables, we find
that CEOs become much more likely to retire once their pensions become fully payable, with
the effects operating most strongly for CEOs at age 60 and at ages 65 and above. Moreover,
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for CEOs who do not retire when pensions become payable, we find that they collect additional
cash compensation, equal to approximately 50 cents for each dollar of foregone pension income.
These results have special significance since the role of pensions has not thus far been highlighted
in the literature on turnovers.
In Section 7, we study the agency costs of debt stemming from the “asset-substitution” or
“risk-shifting” incentives of equity-holding CEOs. These incentives are dampened and agency
costs mitigated when the CEO holds debt in the company, so, ceteris paribus, debt-based com-
pensation should reduce the riskiness of the firm’s external debt. We test for this implication. As
our metric of risk, we use the firm’s “distance-to-default,” which is, loosely speaking, the number
of standard deviation moves in the firm’s value required to put the firm in default. (A higher
distance-to-default indicates a lower likelihood of default.) The notion of distance-to-default as
capturing default risk was popularized in the Moody’s KMV implementation of Merton’s (1974)
model and is now widely accepted as a good ordinal proxy for default risk. We find the data
backs the theory. As CEO pension values increase relative to their equity values, risk-taking
as measured by distance-to-default declines. A firm’s distance-to-default is 0.3 to 0.4 standard
deviations higher when the CEO’s personal debt-equity ratio exceeds his company’s debt-equity
ratio.
The overall picture suggested by both theory and data is that pension plans induce a change
in management style in the direction of conservatism. Two other checks we perform (debt-rating
changes plotted against pension values, and capital-expenditures plotted against pension values)
back this implication, at least with respect to the top tail of the distribution of pension values.
Finally, in Section 8, we look at the effects of pension holdings on payout policies. In general,
higher equity holdings by a CEO should create an incentive for higher payouts, but the holdings
of stock options (which are protected against stock repurchases but not against dividends) and
inside debt may create incentives in the opposite direction. We are able to develop only limited
empirical evidence along these lines.
We believe our paper is the first to highlight the importance of debt-based compensation as
an element of top management contracts, and also the first to call attention to the underlying
incentive and governance implications of these schemes. Our concluding remarks in Section 9
point to several open questions, both theoretical and empirical, beyond those addressed in this
paper.
2 Literature Review
The large theoretical literature that has developed around managerial compensation and agency
problems has seen a number of models justify the use of equity in a manager’s compensation
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package. However, the possibility of using debt instruments for management compensation has
received little attention.
In general, the impact of debt and equity holdings on the manager’s incentives depends on
the capital structure of the firm itself. Begining with Jensen and Meckling (1976), several papers
have examined the design of the “ownership structure” of a firm, defined as the combination of
the firm’s capital structure and the composition of its managerial compensation. The canonical
model involves an “owner-manager” who seeks to raise outside financing (outside debt and/or
equity) to fund a project. The objective is to choose these components optimally to minimize
deadweight losses from agency. We discuss some of these papers in this section.
Jensen and Meckling (1976) consider an owner-manager who retains an equity interest in the
firm which forms his sole compensation. They note that outside equity finance creates moral
hazard concerns: The manager bears the full cost of effort expended in generating returns but
receives only a part of the rewards, so he does not have adequate incentives to expend optimal
effort. Outside debt, on the other hand, creates risk-shifting problems: The manager, as the
holder of a convex residual claim on the firm, has an incentive to suboptimally increase the
riskiness of the firm’s cash flows. Deadweight costs result in either case that preclude first-best
outcomes.
Jensen and Meckling do not, for the most part, consider including debt in the manager’s
compensation, except for a brief section in which they note that having the manager hold debt
and equity in the same ratio as they appear in the firm’s capital structure eliminates the risk-
shifting problems associated with outside debt.2
Jensen and Meckling consider the problems of outside debt and outside equity separately (their
framework does not encompass effort-avoidance and risk-shifting possibilities simultaneously) so
they do not discuss the optimality of debt compensation in general or its impact on the moral
hazard problem. Hellwig (1994) studies a generalization of the Jensen-Meckling framework that
simultaneously admits both shirking and risk-shifting.
Matters are much more complex in Hellwig’s model; for example, the manager can hide a low
effort choice behind a high risk choice. Hellwig finds that under certain conditions, the optimal
contract involves the issue of outside debt and outside equity; the manager holds the residual
equity but still does not hold debt. Other more complex (and less reasonable) outcomes are
possible in Hellwig’s model, but none are discussed which involve the manager holding debt.
The Jensen-Meckling and Hellwig frameworks focus on the different patterns of income
streams generated by different securities (and their consequent incentive effects) but do not
2Controlling the problems of risk-shifting leads to an empirical prediction that the amount of equity pay for a
manager should vary inversely with firm leverage. See the model of John and John (1993) and empirical evidence
in numerous papers such as Bryan, Hwang, and Lilien (2000) and Ortiz-Molina (2004).
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pay much attention to the control rights conferred by these securities. In practice, a specific
correlation is observed: equityholders, the holders of junior convex claims, control the firm in
good states of the world, while debtholders, the holders of senior concave claims, control the
firm in bad states. Motivated by this, Dewatripont and Tirole (1994) describe a model in which
multiple outside investors hold diverse securities (outside debt and outside equity), and there is
control by debtholders in bad states and by equityholders in good states.3 In the optimal contract
in the Dewatripont-Tirole model, managerial compensation is tied to equity value, rather than
to firm value; debt is once again not a part of the compensation package. Loosely put, under
the optimal incentive scheme, managers need to be punished when they take low effort levels,
so control should pass to debtholders who have an incentive to choose actions that hurt the
equity-holding manager.
It is possible that the literature’s focus on rationalizing a congruence of interests between
the manager and equityholders stems from the widely-held belief that compensation schemes
in practice exhibit such alignment. However, the empirical evidence we present in this paper
indicates that senior managers’ interests are more closely tied to debt holders than is commonly
acknowledged, and that at least in some firms, managers hold more inside debt than inside
equity. This suggests that a reappraisal of the literature may be in order. It also points to the
need to develop new theoretical frameworks that can address the possible optimality of debt—in
particular, pension—compensation. Our objective in this paper is to the lay the foundation for
thinking about these issues. We do not look to provide an alternative theoretical framework here,
nor do we assert that the use of debt in the compensation structure is optimal in any sense.
Rather, we derive incentive implications of debt compensation drawn from a simple setting, and
test for these implications in the data.
Virtually no previous empirical scholarship has studied the role of pensions in top manage-
ment compensation. When CEOs’ pensions are mentioned in academic journals, the discussion
occasionally includes references to the annual amount due to a CEO upon retirement, but almost
never to the actuarially fair present value of the lifetime entitlement. A recent exception is a law
school working paper by Bebchuk and Jackson (2005), who tabulate the pension values for 51
current or recently retired CEOs of S&P 500 companies and conclude that pensions represent a
significant component of those CEOs’ compensation.4
3Other relevant papers in this context include Zender (1991) and Aghion and Bolton (1992) who also address
the point that income streams and control rights have a specific relationship, but who do not have multiple outside
investors; and Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) who have multiple claimholders but no outside equity.
4It is not clear to us that the pension values in that paper have been calculated correctly, as the authors rely
upon life annuity price quotes from a commercial website affiliated with ”Annuity Shopper” magazine. Rather
than using the cost of debt for each CEO’s employer, the authors appear to be using the discount rate implicit in
an average annuity price quote from 16 insurance companies associated with the magazine and its website. This
methodology is equivalent to assuming that all CEOs’ pensions are fully funded, which is not the case. For CEOs
below retirement age, Bebchuk and Jackson use a standard discount rate of 5 percent, which appears too low.
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Two other branches of research are related to our work. An earlier line of compensation
research studied the“horizon problem” of CEOs approaching retirement and made certain em-
pirical predictions that resemble some of ours. The horizon problem concerns CEOs who reduce
investment and R&D spending in their final years in order to maximize accounting earnings and
reap larger annual cash bonuses. See Dechow and Sloan (1991). We also predict that CEOs
behave more conservatively as they grow old, but the motivation in our paper involves not the
maximization of annual bonus income, but instead the safeguarding of the value of their pensions
and deferred compensation. The means by which CEOs do so may involve some mix of reduc-
ing investment spending, selecting less risky projects, unlevering the firm’s capital structure, or
lengthening the maturity of the firm’s debt.
A separate, rich literature has considered the role of defined benefit pension plans as an aspect
of corporate finance generally. Pension plans have important effects upon corporate taxation,
funds available for investment, mergers and acquisitions, and especially in recent years, earnings
management. A notable recent example of this research is Rauh (2004). However, this literature
has not considered the importance of pensions in the compensation of individual managers, which
is our focus.
3 Data Description
Data for our study comes from 237 firms drawn from the 2002 Fortune 500 ranking of the
largest U.S. companies. From the initial list of 500 companies, we drop all private firms as
well as those public companies that do not have a history on the ExecuComp compensation
database extending at least ten years back to 1993. This results in a subset of 237 firms, and
we retain observations for the seven-year period 1996-2002, for a final sample of 1,659 firm-year
observations. An historical sample selection rule is necessary for this research, because pension
values are calculated based upon as many as five years lagged data for past compensation, and
we reserve data for the years 1993-95 to use in these computations. In some cases, we must
retrieve company proxy statements back to 1991 from Internet sources in order to collect the
necessary compensation history for certain executives. Because of the sample design, the data
set includes some over-representation of larger firms with longer operating histories.
The “inside debt” compensation owed by firms to their CEOs can take the form of either
pension obligations or deferred compensation. Because disclosure is extremely limited for deferred
compensation,5 we must restrict the analysis in this paper to pensions only. In the minority of
The discount rates used for our pension calculations below range from 4.92 percent to 15.25 percent, depending
on the date and the credit rating of each CEO’s employer. The pension values in Bebchuk and Jackson’s paper
therefore appear to be over-stated.
5Nearly every company has a deferred compensation plan for its executives, but disclosure is only required
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cases in which deferred compensation values can be inferred (less than 15 percent of the sample),
this form of inside debt is usually far less than the value of pensions, so the omission of deferred
compensation from our analysis may not be serious.
CEO Pensions
Pensions for CEOs are usually called supplemental executive retirement plans, or SERPs, since
their payouts far exceed the maximum federally-insured amounts available to most workers under
ordinary tax-qualified pension plans. SERP pension liabilities represent unsecured, unfunded
debt held by executives against the firm, and should the firm become insolvent, SERP pension
beneficiaries would stand in line with other creditors.6 A firm generally does not receive a tax
deduction until pension payments are made to a retired executive, and the executive does not face
an income tax liability until payments are received. For at least some firms, pensions therefore offer
the possibility for net tax savings between the company and an executive by shifting compensation
from the present to the future, when one party or the other might expect to have lower marginal
tax rates compared to the present.
We calculate the actuarially fair present value of each CEO’s pension as of the end of each
fiscal year. The large majority of CEO pensions are defined benefit plans that pay a fixed amount
per year upon retirement. Typically the pension is payable as a life annuity, although some
companies disclose pension values based upon different annuity types.7 All companies specify a
of “above-market interest” earned on the deferred compensation account balance. Above-market interest occurs
only if the company credits the executive with a fixed rate of interest and this fixed rate exceeds 110 percent of
the Internal Revenue Service ”applicable federal rate” which was in effect at the time of establishment of the plan.
Using this information, one can convert the amount of above-market interest paid during a year to an executive
into an average annual balance in their deferred compensation account. Most firms do not pay a fixed rate of
interest but instead permit deferred compensation balances to be invested in diversified index funds, bond funds,
or synthetic shares of company stock, and in these cases no disclosure of executive earnings is required.
6About 15% of the sample companies fund executives’ pensions with so-called “rabbi” trust funds or similar de-
vices such as insurance policies. Rabbi trusts are irrevocable, meaning that the firm cannot withdraw contributions
once they are made, but in the event of bankruptcy these trusts can be reached by the firm’s creditors. A separate
and much rarer device, a “secular” trust fund, can be used to secure an executive’s pension in a bankruptcy-proof
form, but these trusts have adverse income tax consequences and are extremely controversial with creditors and
other employees. The CEOs of both Delta Air Lines Inc. and AMR Corp. (the parent of American Airlines) lost
their jobs in 2003-4 after disclosing that they had created such trusts for the benefit of themselves and other top
managers. See Bachelder (1995 and 2003) as well as www.401kpsp.com/rabbitrust.htm.
7Two popular alternatives are a life annuity with a guaranteed minimum term, and a joint life annuity payable
for the longer of the life of the CEO and his or her spouse. Calculations for the values of other annuities require
only straightforward modifications to equation (1). In cases of joint spousal annuities, we assume that the CEO is
married with a spouse of the same age. Many firms give executives the option of choosing among several payout
schemes, with the annual amount adjusted in an actuarially fair way so that the overall value of the pension does
not change.
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minimum retirement age, which is the earliest age that an executive can leave the company and
obtain 100 percent of the earned pension benefit (most companies will pay a reduced amount in
the event of early retirement). If the CEO chooses to work beyond the minimum retirement age,
he forfeits the right to pension benefits that he would otherwise have collected by retiring. The
formula for the fair actuarial value of a CEO’s pension is, in most cases:
K−A∑
n=max(0,R−A)
p(n)X
(1 + d)n
(1)
where X is the annual pension amount, R is the minimum retirement age, A is the CEO’s current
age, p(n) is the probability that the CEO is alive n years in the future, d is the firm’s cost of
long-term debt, and K is the terminal year of the pension. The mortality probabilities by age,
p(n), are obtained separately for male and female CEOs using actuarial tables published by the
U.S. Social Security Administration. In theory K can increase without limit, but for simplicity we
set K = 120 and assume that all CEOs die with certainty by age 120, so that p(120− A) = 0.
The CEO’s current age and the company’s minimum pension retirement age are disclosed in
company proxy statements. The company’s cost of debt is based upon historical bond ratings for
most firms supplied by Moody’s or Standard & Poor’s, and historical corporate yield curves for
different rating classes supplied by Salomon Smith Barney; we use the seven-year U.S. Treasury
bond yield plus an appropriate markup for each rating class, because seven years approximates
the duration of cash flows that most CEOs expect from their pension entitlements. When no
bond rating is available, we estimate a company’s debt rating based upon comparable companies;
a majority of the observations without bond ratings are for firms with little or no long-term debt
outstanding, and we classify them as Aaa credits. Within the range of different rating classes of
investment grade debt, small changes in assumptions about discount rates do not lead to material
changes in estimated pension values.
The most difficult part of the calculation arises in estimating X, the annual pension amount
that each CEO is entitled to receive upon retirement. In some cases companies disclose this
value directly, but more often it must be inferred from other information published in the proxy
statement, a process that requires time-consuming research for each company. In practice, the
annual pension entitlement is usually calculated according to the following formula:
P∑
k=1
Ct−k
P
×M × S, (2)
where Ct is the cash salary and bonus compensation for year t, P is a number of past years
(usually either three or five) whose compensation is averaged together as part of the formula,
M is a multiplier factor that usually lies in a neighborhood between 0.015 and 0.020, and S is
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the executive’s number of years of service. Often the formula is modified so that the product
MS is capped at a value of perhaps 0.50 or 0.60. Therefore, for many long-serving executives
the pension payment will equal 60 percent of the average pay received in their final three years
in office.8 The structure of the formula effectively serves as a multiplier on the value of current
cash compensation, since a CEO who receives a pay increase will see that increase feed into the
pension formula and increase his retirement pay as well. This effect intensifies as the CEO gets
older, since the present value of future pension income grows larger as he nears retirement. Under
a reasonable set of assumptions,9 an extra dollar of cash compensation received in one year adds
about 48 cents to the actuarial present value of a pension when a CEO is 55 years old, and
about $1.10 when he is 65. Since this override effect exerted by pension plans upon salary and
bonus income tends to strengthen as CEOs near retirement, it resembles the optimal life-cycle
compensation scheme derived by Gibbons and Murphy (1992), who argue that executives near
retirement require the strongest pay-performance incentives.
Companies are required by the Securities and Exchange Commission to disclose annual pension
payments in a matrix format, in which years of service S are tabulated on one axis, and final
average compensation C is tabulated on the other. The pension formula itself is not directly
disclosed, but it can be inferred for any single executive by locating his position on the matrix
and interpolating between cells. Many companies reduce the pension payout by the amount of an
executive’s Social Security entitlement, but because this sum is trivial for most CEOs (perhaps 1
to 3 percent of their pensions), we do not take account of this adjustment.
4 Descriptive Statistics
Tables II–IV and Figure 1 present information concerning CEO pensions and other aspects of
their compensation. Table II shows that for most CEOs, equity value is far higher than pension
value, and the median ratio between these two quantities is 0.07. However, as shown below, this
ratio increases markedly as CEOs grow older.
The first step is to measure the annual increment to CEO pensions. This is the present (i.e.,
actuarially fair) value of the amount by which the CEO’s annual pension entitlement increases
8Equation (2) is written so that the pension payout is based on compensation received in the most recent P
years in office. Some firms instead use the highest P -year average achieved in any P consecutive years in office,
while still others use the highest any P individual years, whether consecutive or not. In practice, because cash
compensation tends to increase almost monotonically over an executive’s career, all of these formulas yield the
same value for most executives. To keep the data collection and calculations tractable for this paper, we use the
formula in equation (2) as the default for all observations unless better information is readily available.
9Assume that the number of years averaged P=5, the multiplier M=0.016, years service S=20 at age 55 and
S=30 at age 65, and the real discount rate d=0.03. If we instead assume P=3, the totals would be 80 cents and
$1.84, respectively.
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when time moves forward by a year, i.e., when equation (2) is recalculated after (a) including the
most recent compensation Ct−1 and omitting Ct−(P+1), and (b) changing S to S + 1. Concep-
tually, one could think of the corporation issuing a new bond to the CEO each year, representing
a lifetime annuity with a face value equal to this difference which is:
M
P
(
[Ct−1 − Ct−(P+1)]S +
P∑
k=1
Ct−k
)
.
The present value of this mean annual increment across our sample equals $1.0 million. This
value, as well as the mean values for subgroups of CEOs reported in Table III, are somewhat
understated, because our calculations essentially rely on first differences in compensation and
force us to discard the observation for each CEO’s first year in the dataset if he has a non-zero
pension; this process causes a disproportionately large number of zero-valued observations to
enter the calculations.
A second number of interest is the annual change in the present value of total pension
entitlement. This change could be negative if the annual pension increment is negative, which
could happen, for example, if Ct−1 < Ct−(P+1). More generally, it could also be negative if the
company changes its pension formula, if its cost of debt rises, if the CEO takes a cut in his cash
compensation, of if the CEO works past the normal retirement age and fails to draw down his
pension when it becomes available. CEOs may also perceive their pensions as having lower values
if poor health, high stress, or lifestyle choices shorten their life expectancies, a possibility that we
do not consider.
Pension values decline on an objective actuarial basis for about 6 percent of the CEO-year
observations in the sample, and a significant number of these observations occur due to market-
wide increases in interest rates that reduce the value of all pensions across-the-board. However,
in the vast majority of cases, CEO pension values rise each year. Even if there is no change in
basic comepnsation, the CEO’s years of service (the variable S in equation (2)) will increase each
year, his life expectancy will increase, and the discounted value of future pension entitlements
will increase as well. As shown in Table II, the mean overall change in a CEO’s pension value is
also about $1.0 million each year.
CEO pension values are highly sensitive to age. Figure 1 illustrates mean and median ac-
tuarially fair pension values for all CEOs in the sample between ages 51 and 65. As shown on
the graph, the mean lifetime pension entitlement has a present value of just $1.5 million for
51-year-old CEOs, but this rises to more than $10 million at age 65; the median values increase
from $0.9 million to $6.4 million over the same range. The convex shape of the top graph shows
that the rate of pension growth accelerates as CEOs age. Data on the graph are likely subject
to some self-selection bias, as those CEOs with the most valuable pensions may be inclined to
retire earlier and drop out of the sample.
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Table III shows mean values for all sources of CEO compensation, including the annual in-
crement to pension value, for the entire sample and for subsamples of CEOs arranged according
to age. The sum of total compensation from all categories is almost invariant to age, averaging
right around $10 million per CEO per year, but the importance of pension value as part of overall
compensation change increases monotonically up to age 65. For CEOs in the age 46-50 group,
the annual pension increment averages $400,000, representing about 4 percent of total compen-
sation. In the age 61-65 group, in contrast, the average pension increase is $1.6 million annually,
representing about 15 percent of total compensation. Beyond age 65, pensions begin to lose
their importance; all members of this group are sacrificing the right to draw down their pensions
by continuing to work, which makes the net change in pension value lower than for those younger
than 65. One can also assume that many CEOs with the most lucrative pensions retire by age
65 and exit the sample.
Data near the bottom of Table III shows the ratio between pension value and equity value
for CEOs in different age groups. The data indicate that this ratio also increases monotonically,
rising from about 0.05 for CEOs in the 46-50 year-old age bracket to 0.27 for CEOs aged 61-65,
until it too falls off for CEOs aged 66 and above. In other words, pension values tend to rise more
rapidly than the value of equity owned as CEOs grow older, giving managers increasing incentives
to run the firm more in the interests of debtholders and less in the interests of equityholders.
The last line of the table shows the fraction of CEOs for whom the personal debt/equity ratio
(pension value divided by share plus option value) exceeds the firm’s overall debt/equity ratio
(short- and long-term debt divided by the market value of equity). This group of CEOs will have
clear incentives to pursue policies that favor debt more than equity. Thirteen percent of all CEOs
fall into this group, with the fraction again rising monotonically by age.
Table IV presents detail about the form and structure of CEO pensions within the sample.
Pensions are held by CEOs in all but 23% of the firm-year observations, and the vast majority
of these pensions are awarded based on the age/service formula used in equation (2) above. A
minority of CEOs negotiate their pensions directly as part of their employment contracts,10 or
participate in cash balance pension plans which are generally quite modest in value. For about
three-fourths of all CEOs, the retirement age at which full pension benefits become available is
65, though a minority of firms pay full pensions at earlier ages, some as young as age 55. Most
CEO pensions are based upon final average compensation which always includes salary and also
10The table indicates that 6 percent of CEOs negotiate fixed pension amounts in their employment contracts.
However, a larger number negotiate modifications to the pay/service formula to make it more generous for
themselves than the formula used for regular company employees. For example, while serving as the CEO of CSX
Corp., John W. Snow had an employment contract calling for his pension to be calculated including the value of
restricted stock grants as part of his annual income, an enhancement of the company’s ordinary formula that took
account of only salary and bonus; while serving as the CEO of Alcoa Inc., Paul H. O’Neill had an employment
contract that awarded him two years of service time for pension purposes for every one year worked.
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includes bonuses 94 percent of the time. A small minority of firms take into account other forms
of compensation, such as restricted stock awards or long-term incentive plans, when making these
calculations. Final average compensation is nearly always based upon either three years pay (39
percent of all observations), or five years pay (54 percent). We find that a significant amount of
variation exists both between firms and within firms in the design of pension plans. Sixty seven
firms, or 28 perecent of those in the sample, change either the form of their pension plan or the
underlying formula at some point during the seven-year sample period, not counting several dozen
firms that negotiate one-time pension enhancements with CEOs in their final year of service (see
Yermack, 2005).
These data indicate unambiguously that pensions are a large part of overall CEO compensa-
tion. Nonetheless, current SEC regulations require only complex and somewhat opaque disclosures
about pensions, and financial acumen is required to convert the reported data into estimates of
the fair value of any executive’s pension. Disclosure practices in certain other countries such
as the U.K. provide far more illuminating reports of pension values and their annual changes.
Moreover, disclosure requirements are non-existent in the U.S. for most aspects of deferred com-
pensation, as well as post-retirement transactions involving pension rights such as “SERP swaps”
that are understood to be available to many top executives but never disclosed.
5 Cross-Sectional Determinants of CEO Debt vs Equity
Holdings
We analyze the distribution of CEOs’ inside debt and equity ownership within our sample of 237
firms. We measure inside debt value as the fair actuarial present value of CEO pension holdings
and equity value as the market value of stock and stock options, with option portfolios valued
according to standard Black-Scholes assumptions.11 As discussed above, the absence of deferred
compensation from our analysis will lead to estimates of CEO debt values somewhat below the
true level. Since we are assessing the relative strength of debt and equity ownership for our
sample CEOs, the dependent variable in our regression analysis equals the ratio of pension (or
debt) value divided by stock plus option (or equity) value. We refer to this quantity as the “CEO’s
11We obtain information about the number of options held and their average exercise prices from ExecuComp.
We then estimate option portfolio values by applying a “representative option” approach that has become widely
used in the compensation literature. Core and Guay (2002) provide empirical validation of this approach. We
assume all outstanding options have six-year lives and use the prevailing firm volatilities, dividend rates, and risk
free rates to value them on a Black-Scholes basis. If all of the outstanding options are out-of-the-money, we cannot
calculate an average exercise price for the representative option. In these cases we read older proxy statements
until we can obtain enough information about the options’ exercise prices in order to use the representative option
method.
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debt/equity ratio.”
We test several well-known theories of compensation that appear in the literature on eq-
uity incentives (Yermack, 1995), in tandem with theories of debt-based compensation that are
discussed above. These include:
• Leverage: Because debt-based compensation reduces the agency costs of debt, we should
observe a positive association between the CEO’s debt/equity ratio and the firm’s leverage.
We measure leverage as long-term debt over the sum of long-term debt and stockholders’
equity, as reported by Compustat. We use the book value instead of the market value of
equity to avoid a mechanical negative association between the leverage variable and the
market value of CEOs’ equity holdings.
• Liquidity: Equity compensation provides a means for firms to pay executives without the
use of cash. We therefore expect a negative association between measures of liquidity and
CEOs’ debt/equity ratios. We measure liquidity constraints with an indicator variable that
equals 1 if the firm pays zero dividends (Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen, 1988).
• Growth opportunities: Equity pay is expected to be used when a firm has many valu-
able investment opportunities that are best understood by managers instead of outside
shareholders or directors. We therefore expect a negative association between measures of
growth opportunities and the CEO’s debt/equity ratio. We use the ratio of research and
development expense over sales as a proxy for growth opportunities. We avoid other mea-
sures that rely on the company’s stock price, such as the market-to-book ratio or Tobin’s
Q, because these will exhibit mechanical positive correlations with the value of the CEO’s
equity holdings.
• Tax status: Taxation plays a role in both stock option and pension compensation. Each
provides opportunities for income deferral to future years, which could result in a net tax
savings for the firm and executive depending on the marginal tax rates of each. Stock
options have additional favorable tax treatment under certain conditions, although CEO
stock option awards are generally too large to qualify for these benefits. We include as a
regression control an indicator variable for whether the firm has net operating loss carry-
forwards on its balance sheet as a proxy for its tax status. However, we cannot make an
unambiguous prediction about the sign of the estimate for this variable, since compensation
in both the numerator and denominator of the CEO’s debt/equity ratio delivers certain types
of tax benefits.
We estimate our regressions in standard panel data models to control for firm-specific and
CEO-specific fixed effects (these intercepts unique to each company or each CEO negate the
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need for industry controls). All regressions include control variables for the firm size (the log of
total assets), dummy variables for individual years, and a range of governance variables including
the log of board size, the percent of outside directors on the board, the CEO’s years tenure in
office, and the percentage ownership by institutional investors as reported by Thomson/CDA.
Most importantly, we control for CEO years of service, because the formula for the accumulation
of pension value will mechanically increase a CEO’s debt incentives based upon his years with the
firm, as discussed above.
Table V presents the regression estimates. In the left two columns, estimates are based
upon the value of the CEO’s pension alone; these estimates are shown so that the reader can
assess whether the results for the CEO’s debt/equity ratio, shown in the right two columns, are
influenced by its numerator or denominator. Some of the control variables are untabulated in
order to save space.
The firm’s leverage ratio, the key explanatory variable in the model, has a positive and
significant association with the CEO’s debt/equity ratio, as shown by estimates in the right
columns. This result is consistent with firms using larger pensions and smaller equity awards in
order to mitigate the agency costs of debt. In the left columns, the firm’s leverage ratio exhibits
a somewhat unexpected negative association with the pension value, though the result has no
significance in one model and only borderline significance in the other. Because the variable has
a positive association with the CEO’s debt/equity ratio, we infer that it is even more negatively
related to equity than to debt-based compensation.
The CEO’s years employed by the firm exhibits a positive association as expected with both
the CEO’s pension value and the ratio of pension value to equity value. However, the result
is significant only when firm dummy variables are used in the model, and not when dummy
variables are included for individual CEOs. CEOs hired from outside the firm appear to have
larger pensions than CEOs promoted internally, but they apparently have larger equity pay as
well, since the ratio of pension value to equity value has no significant association with the
dummy variable for outside-hire CEOs.
Perhaps the most surprising indication in Table V is the absence of evidence that either tax
status or growth opportunities affect the structure of CEO ownership. Liquidity constrained firms
do appear to place greater emphasis on equity compensation and less on debt compensation, as
expected, but this inference is extremely weak as this variable has a significant estimate in only
one of the four models in Table V. While the results fail to validate strongly many predictions
of mainstream contracting theory, this pattern accords with prior empirical research about the
structure of CEO compensation (Yermack, 1995) that shows little or no attention by firms to the
agency costs of debt, tax issues or growth opportunities when awarding CEO pay.
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6 Pensions and CEO turnover
A substantial literature has examined the determinants of executive turnover, but none with
reference to pension payout patterns. Inside debt compensation such as pensions offers incen-
tives to the CEO to leave his position once the debt becomes payable, since ordinarily the debt
is collectible only after the CEO retires. We therefore study the interaction between pension
compensation and patterns of CEO turnover, using logistic regressions presented in Table VI.
The dependent variable in Table VI equals 1 if the CEO leaves his position in the last half
of the current fiscal year or in the first half of the subsequent fiscal year. We separate the cases
of CEO turnover into forced and planned, based upon searches of news stories and disclosures in
company proxy statements; about one-quarter of the turnover events are involuntary according
to our research. We omit several dozen observations in which the CEO cedes the CEO title to
someone else but does not retire or begin to transition out of top management, remaining as the
full-time, permanent Chairman of the Board with compensation equal to or exceeding the CEO
(Bill Gates of Microsoft would be a representative example).
The three columns of Table VI present logit estimates with the dependent variable equal to
1 for all turnover, forced turnover only, and planned turnover only, from left to right. For our
purposes, the key explanatory variable in Table VI is an indicator for whether the CEO’s pension
is currently payable. This variable equals 1 if the CEO has the right to draw down 100% of his
earned pension benefits, and it equals zero if this right has not yet vested or if the CEO has no
pension. Other explanatory variables in the regressions include the range of controls found in
many studies of CEO turnover: company performance, measured as net-of-market stock return for
the current and prior years; CEO variables, including age, percent ownership, tenure in office, and
membership in the company’s founding family; leverage; market-to-book ratio; and governance
variables including the log of board size, the percent of outside directors on the board, and the
percentage ownership by institutional investors. All regression estimates include standard errors
robust to serial correlation and heteroskedasticity.
Estimates in Table VI show that the existence of an immediately payable pension significantly
increases the incidence of CEO turnover, after holding constant CEO age and other factors.
The pension indicator variable has a significant estimate in the models for all turnover and for
voluntary turnover, but not for forced turnover. This pattern of estimates makes sense, since the
CEO controls his departure decision only in voluntary turnover cases. The economic significance
of the estimate is substantial; the logit marginal effect for the pension payable indicator indicates
that when this variable equals 1, CEO turnover rises by 4.3%, a very large magnitude compared
to the unconditional voluntary turnover rate of 7.7%.
Further analysis of the pension indicator variable, based upon untabulated regressions, shows
that pension availability influences CEO turnover especially strongly at two points: for CEOs aged
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60, and for CEOs over age 65. Though age 60 lies below the customary U.S. retirement age of 65,
data in Table IV indicate that it represents a focal point in the careers of some CEOs because a
because a significant number of firms (about 11% of the sample) provide for full pension benefits
at that age (very few firms have pensions payable before age 60). At ages between 61 and 65
CEO turnover tends to increase year by year, but pension availability has little effect. Beyond age
65, availability of full pension benefits again acts as a significant motivation for CEOs to retire.
Annual turnover frequencies plotted in Figure 2 reinforce the economic significance of Table
VI’s regression estimates. The figure shows voluntary turnover frequencies by age for CEOs
who are at or beyond the age at which their pensions are 100% payable, compared to turnover
frequencies for CEOs who are younger than the full pension age. The graph excludes CEOs who
do not have pensions and also omits cases of forced CEO turnover. No CEOs younger than 60
are shown in the top graph, and none older than 64 in the bottom graph, since only a tiny handful
fall into these categories. A large disparity exists in turnover rates for CEOs of the same age,
according to whether or not their pensions have become fully payable; for example, for 63-year-old
CEOs, the voluntary turnover rate is 8 percent in companies whose pensions are not yet payable
in full, while the rate increases to 27 percent in firms where the pension payable age is at or
below the CEO’s age. The graph is no doubt influenced by mandatory retirement policies which
are likely to be synchronized with pension payability ages at many firms.
Other estimates in Table VI also provide illuminating results about CEO turnover. Com-
pany stock performance exhibits significant negative associations with forced turnover but not
voluntary. Indicators of CEO entrenchment such as high stock ownership and founding family
membership are also negatively associated with turnover, but somewhat surprisingly, they appear
to impact voluntary turnover only. These results suggest that CEOs with high personal stakes in
the company, either for ownership or family reasons, choose to serve longer tenures but are not
immune to removal for disciplinary reasons.
In Table VII we analyze the annual cash compensation of CEOs, with the key explanatory
variable equal to the pension payments that certain CEOs forego when they continue in office
past the age at which full pension benefits would be available for payout. This variable, which
appears in the last row of the table, equals zero for all CEOs who are below the pension payout
age or who work for companies with no pensions. Other variables in the compensation regression
include the excess stock return for the current and prior year, firm size, and CEO characteristics
including age, percentage ownership, years tenure in office, and founding family membership.
The table includes fixed effect panel data estimates for models with intercepts unique to each
firm and to each CEO.
Regression estimates in Table VII show that firms pay higher cash compensation when they
have larger size and when they are successful, as evidenced by positive excess stock returns. Cash
compensation also appears strongly affected when pension benefits are sacrificed by CEOs who
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serve past the full pension age. Coefficient estimates for the foregone pension variable in the
two columns are 0.46 and 0.49 respectively, both strongly significant. The estimates imply that
CEOs receive close to 50 cents on the dollar in immediate compensation for foregone pension
benefits. In addition, this incremental compensation will feed into the calculation of the CEO’s
pension benefits when he ultimately retires. According to the multiplier estimates discussed in
Section 3 above, the net increase in the CEO’s wealth should more than compensate him for the
opportunity cost of not drawing his pension immediately.
7 Inside Debt and Risk Reduction
When top executives receive part of their compensation in debt and part in equity, we would
expect them to manage the firm in a way that considers the interests of both debt and equity
investors. Classic agency cost of debt problems related to risk-shifting and excessive payouts
should diminish in importance when managers hold large pensions or deferred compensation.
We use the simple framework of Merton (1974) to clarify our hypotheses in this context.
Consider a firm with two securities outstanding: zero-coupon debt with face value F and maturity
T , and equity. If the value VT of the firm’s assets on date T exceeds F , the debt is paid off
and the balance goes to the firm’s equity holders. If VT < F , the firm is liquidated. Assume
liquidation is costless and absolute priority holds. Then the payoffs to debt and equity holders on
date T are, respectively:
min(F, V ) and max(VT − F, 0). (3)
Now suppose the firm’s manager holds a fraction α of the firm’s equity and a fraction β of
its debt. The time T payoffs to the manager are:
α max(VT − F, 0) + β min(VT , F ). (4)
The value of the manager’s portfolio and its sensitivity to various parameters can now be deter-
mined using standard option pricing theory. If C(F ) is the current value of a call option on the
firm with strike price F , the current value of the manager’s portfolio is:
αC(F ) + β (V − C(F )) = βV + (α− β)C(F ). (5)
The most obvious parameter of interest is risk, which enters the option pricing formulae in the
form of volatility. In the oft-analyzed case in which a manager holds equity, he has an incentive to
increase the firm’s risk beyond the level desired by debtholders. In our setting, since the manager
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holds both debt and equity, this incentive for risk-shifting is lessened; with enough inside debt
compensation, the manager may even have an incentive to reduce volatility. From (5), the impact
of a change in volatility on the value of the manager’s portfolio is just:
(α− β)× Vega(C(F )) (6)
This is positive if α > β, zero if α = β, and negative if α < β. In other words, if the debt-equity
ratio of the manager’s holdings is less than the firm’s debt-equity ratio, the manager has an
incentive to increase risk, and vice versa.
To test whether managers’ inside debt holdings in the form of pensions have an impact upon
the firm’s riskiness, we utilize the concept of the “distance to default” statistic popularized by
Moody’s KMV and now widely-accepted as a qualitatively reliable indicator of default likelihood.
The distance-to-default (henceforth, DtD) is the number of standard deviations of decline in
a firm’s asset value that would push it into default. KMV’s operationalization of this notion
requires converting a firm’s debt structure into an “equivalent” zero-coupon form. Following
their approach (see Crouhy, Mark, and Galai (2001) or Sundaram (2001)), we define the default
point DPT to be equal to the sum of the face value of short-term debt (less than one year) plus
half the face value of long-term debt (greater than one year) and to have a maturity of one year.
This simple approximation has been found to work well in practice. With this, the distance to
default statistic is
DtD =
V −DPT
σV
(7)
Here, V is the firm’s asset market value, as above, and σ is the firm’s asset value volatility.
To estimate this, we must obtain values for the unobserved variables V and σ. The KMV model
does this as follows. Under the default point DPT , equity holders have a call option to buy the
firm for DPT in one year’s time. The value of this call—which depends on V and σ—is the value
of equity which is observable. Since we have two unknowns, we need a second equation. For
this, we use equity volatility σE which too is observed. Standard stochastic calculus arguments
show that equity volatility and firm value and volatility are related via
σE = σ
V
E
∆E (8)
where E is the market value of equity and ∆E is the derivative ∂E/∂V of the option value
function with respect to firm value (i.e., it is the delta of the call option that equityholders own).
Using these two equations and information regarding the risk-free rate, we can now solve for V
and σ for each firm-year observation and substitute those values into (7) to obtain the estimated
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distance to default. We do these DtD calculations using an iterative spreadsheet algorithm.
We discard observations for which DPT/V < 0.01, assuming that firms with a trivial amount
of debt would never default. This exclusion removes 81 firm-years, or about 5% of the sample.
Descriptive statistics for the distance to default statistic appear in Table II. The mean and median
distance to default are about three standard deviations of annual performance.
Table VIII presents our regression analysis of the distance to default, again using fixed effects
panel data models. In addition to variables related to CEO incentives, we control for several firm
variables that should have obvious relations to the likelihood of default: firm size (the log of
total assets), leverage (in a book value form), and diversification (the number of segments for
which the firm reports line-of-business data). We also include a variety of other governance and
financial controls listed in the table. Our key explanatory variables are (i) the ratio of the CEO’s
pension value divided by the value of his stock plus options equity holdings, and (ii) an indicator
that takes the value of 1 if the CEO’s personal debt/equity ratio exceeds the firm’s debt/equity
ratio, calculated based upon the market value of equity. Under this condition the CEO will have
incentives to manage the firm in ways that increase debt value relative to equity value.
Coefficient estimates in Table VIII are positive and significant for both specifications of the
CEO’s debt/equity ratio. A unit increase in this ratio implies an increase in distance to default
close to 0.14, according to estimates in the left columns. Similarly, the right columns’ estimates
indicate that distance to default is approximately 0.3 to 0.4 standard deviations higher when the
CEO’s debt/equity ratio exceeds the company’s overall ratio, which occurs for about 13 percent of
the observations in the data according to summary statistics in Table III. The regression estimate
therefore implies that these CEOs take actions, such as accepting fewer risky investments, that
reduce the likelihood of default and the risks to their own pension values.
We find that firm size exhibits a positive association with distance to default and leverage
has a negative association, both as expected, which the variable measuring diversification has
estimates close to zero.
We carry out two mode tests to check the relationship between pension holdings and aspects
of risk-reduction, in order to gain greater insight into the results shown in Table VIII. Figure 3
presents a plot of debt ratings changes against pension values. As the figure shows, the relation
is roughly monotone with increased pension holdings leading to a greater frequency of net ratings
upgrades, especially at the top range of the distribution of pension values. Figure 4 displays
capital investments (capital expenditure + R&D) plotted against pension holdings. Again, the
result is roughly monotone with capital investments declining as pension values increase. This
pattern is consistent with CEOs reducing investment spending and leaving assets in more liquid
form as their pension values increase, a behavior that would generally reduce firm risk. Each
figure indicates that the greatest incremental impact of pensions upon either ratings changes
or investment levels occurs at the top of the distribution, among CEOs holding the very most
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valuable pensions. We estimate regressions of the relationships in Figures 3 and 4 but are not
able to obtain significant results, apparently because the relation between pension values and the
two dependent variables is narrowly driven by the relatively small group of high-valued pension
observations.
8 Inside Debt and Payouts to Equity
Options and stock holdings of managers offer different incentives to provide payouts to equityhold-
ers, with options skewing managerial preferences towards repurchases and away from dividends.
At least two reasons have been offered in the literature for why this might be the case. The
first, suggested in Jolls (1998) and Fenn and Liang (2000), is that repurchases do not affect the
share price of the firm while dividends reduce the price, so dividends make options less valuable.12
The second, offered by Weisbenner (2000), is that stock repurchases undo partially the effect
of dilution in earnings-per-share resulting from the grant of employee stock options. Empirical
evidence in favor of the first hypothesis is reported by all three studies.
The literature has not considered the impact upon company payouts of inside debt holdings
by managers. For a simple illustration of the importance of inside debt as an influence upon
payouts, consider the model introduced above, and suppose that the manager’s holdings are only
in the form of debt and equity (no options). As earlier, suppose that the manager owns a fraction
α of the firm’s equity and a fraction β of its debt. Then, for each dollar of payouts to equity,
whether in the form of dividends or share repurchases, a fraction α of the benefits accrues to the
manager. However, the fall in the firm’s assets leads to a fall in the value of the manager’s claims
held on the firm. From equation (5), we can see that the manager loses value in the amount:
β + (α− β)∆E, (9)
where ∆E measures the change in equity value for a dollar change in V (i.e., it is the delta of the
call option that represents equity value). Thus, the overall impact of the payout on the manager
is:
α− [β + (α− β)∆E] = (α− β)(1−∆E). (10)
Since 0 < ∆E < 1 always, equation (9) will be positive if α > β, zero if α = β, and negative if
α < β. More generally, this suggests a negative association between payouts and the difference
between the CEO debt-equity ratio and the firm’s.
12The statement that repurchases do not affect share prices is, strictly speaking, incorrect, since—even in the
absence of signalling or other considerations—removing cash from the firm may alter its future prospects and so
affect both debt and equity values. But for debt of low-risk, this effect will be small.
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How do options affect this? Options in general are not protected against dividends, so they
skew the incentives of a CEO away from dividends. Taking this into account, an approximate
idea of the impact of dividends can be obtained as follows. For every $1 change in stock price
on account of dividends, let ∆o denote the change in stock option value. Then, the impact on
option value of a change ∆E in the stock price is ∆o × ∆E. If the CEO holds options on a
fraction γ of the firm, the total change in the value of his portfolio is
(α− β)(1−∆E)− γ(∆o ×∆E).
Of course, this expression is only approximate because it does not take potential dilution into
account from the manager’s exercise of stock options. But it does indicate that the manager’s
equity holding has to be substantially greater than his debt holding (relative to the firm’s debt-
equity ratio) for there to be a positive incentive to pay dividends.
To summarize, like options, holdings of inside debt reduce the manager’s incentives to pay
dividends, but unlike options, inside debt also reduces the incentives for repurchases. This raises
at least two questions of interest. The first is whether payouts to equityholders are generally lower
in the presence of larger inside debt holdings by the CEO. The second concerns the empirical
findings of earlier papers (e.g., Weisbenner, 2000) that option-holding CEOs generally tend not
to favor dividends. Since these papers do not also control for inside debt holdings of the CEO,
the question is to what extent are the anti-dividends results driven by options and not by debt?
We find only limited evidence about the influence of CEO pension holdings upon firms’ payout
policies. We study both dividend payments and share repurchases. We find few significant results
for repurchases, so in Table IX we tabulate regression results for dividend payouts only. Table IX
shows estimates from panel Tobit models in which the dependent variable is the dividend payout
rate, measured as total common dividends divided by market capitalization. The top half of the
table presents estimates with firm effects, while the bottom half presents estimates with CEO
effects. All models include a range of financial and governance control variables which are listed
at the bottom of the table; to save space, we do not tabulate coefficient estimates for these
variables.
In the firm effects specification, we find a negative association between CEO pension value
and dividend payouts as expected. However, this estimate loses about half its magnitude as well
as its statistical significance once the model is expanded to include values of the CEO’s stock and
options. In the CEO effects specification, the estimates for CEO pension value are close to zero
and never significant. In all models, the CEO’s option holdings exert a negative and significant
effect upon the dividend payout rate. We conclude that CEOs’ options appear to influence firms’
payout strategies more clearly than stock or pensions.
22
9 Conclusions
Top managers receive a significant amount of compensation from “inside debt,” or intra-corporate
IOUs such as pensions and deferred compensation. These compensation instruments have re-
ceived very little attention in prior theoretical or empirical research into executive compensation.
Debt-based compensation provides managers with interesting incentives to reduce the agency
costs of debt. Managers holding large pensions, for example, should be expected to pursue
strategies that reduce overall firm risk. These may include choosing fewer risky investment
projects, unlevering the capital structure, reducing payouts to equity holders, or lengthening the
average maturity of outstanding debt.
We find that CEOs hold a portfolio of incentives arising from both inside debt and inside equity
compensation, and this portfolio tends to shift in favor of the inside debt instruments as CEOs
grow older. When a CEO’s personal debt/equity ratio exceeds the firm’s external debt/equity
ratio, regression evidence indicates that CEOs manage more conservatively, taking a variety of
actions that reduce the probability of a debt default.
Inside debt in the form of pensions also exerts strong influence on patterns of CEO turnover
and other types of compensation. We find that, at any given age, the probability of a CEO
retiring voluntarily is far higher if the CEO’s pension has vested and is payable immediately. For
CEOs who continue to work beyond the minimum retirement age, cash compensation is markedly
higher, apparently to compensate them for foregone pension income.
We believe that the study of debt-based incentives for top managers can become a fruitful
area for further research. A top priority would appear to be the development of theory that
illustrates conditions under which debt-based compensation would represent the solution to an
optimal contracting problem. On the empirical side, further research should be possible into
how debt-based pay affects the selection of investment projects and capital structure, as well as
related areas such as security issuance decisions, mergers and acquisitions, recapitalizations, or
the timing of bankruptcy filings. Do managers with large pensions prefer to issue equity rather
than debt? If they do borrow, is it more likely to be from a bank or the public markets? What
sort of maturity structure do they favor? Do managers with large amounts of inside debt seek
out diversifying mergers that reduce firm risk? Are they more or less likely to accept outside
acquisition proposals, and does this decision depend on the capital structure of the bidding firm?
If the CEO has earned a large pension, is a workout to avoid bankruptcy more likely to succeed if
the firm becomes distressed? How will equity holders fare in such as transaction? Opportunities
also exist to study the structure of individual companies’ pension and deferred compensation
arrangements. Why do some firms have more generous pension formulas than others? Why do
some use three instead of five years of compensation in the calculation the pension payout? Why
do minimum retirement ages vary between 55 and 65 for different firms? How much pay do
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firms allow their executives to defer, and how do executives respond to these opportunities? How
do they choose to invest their deferred sums? Historical research into executive compensation
should also profit from greater attention to the role of inside debt. Investigators such as Jensen
and Murphy (1990) have argued that weak pay-performance incentives through much of the 20th
century gave managers little reason to maximize equity value. Such arguments would become
stronger if augmented with data showing that managers in the 1980s, 1970s, and earlier typically
had much more invested in inside debt via pension rights than in equity via stock or options,
which we believe may well be the case.
We also believe our research highlights the potential importance of improved public disclosure
of both pension and deferred compensation schemes. Current SEC regulations require only
complex and somewhat opaque disclosures about pensions, and financial acumen is required to
convert the reported data into estimates of the fair value of any executive’s pension. Disclosure
practices in certain other countries such as the U.K. provide far more illuminating reports of
pension values and their annual changes. In addition, disclosure requirements are non-existent
in the U.S. for most aspects of deferred compensation, as well as post-retirement transactions
involving pension rights such as “SERP swaps” that are understood to be available to many top
executives but never disclosed.
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Table I
John F. Welch’s compensation as CEO of General Electric
Variables related to the compensation of John F. Welch Jr., CEO of General Electric Co., between 1993 and 2002.  Equity awards
represents the sum of the fair value of stock option and restricted stock awards, as reported by the ExecuComp database.  The total
value of Welch’s pension is based upon a formula for the annual pension value disclosed in the company’s proxy statement, which is
assumed to be paid in a life annuity whose actuarial value is calculated based upon Welch’s age and the company’s cost of debt.  The
pension increment is the present value of the change in Welch’s annual pension amount.  The total pension value can change each
year by more or less than the value of the pension increment, due to changes in market interest rates, the life expectancy of the CEO,
or the underlying pension formula.  The value of deferred compensation is inferred from above-market interest income to Welch that
is reported in the proxy statement.  Total inside debt equals the value of Welch’s pension plus deferred compensation.  Total inside
equity equals the market value of stock owned plus the Black-Scholes estimated value of options held.  The debt/equity ratio for the
CEO equals the value of inside debt divided by inside equity.  The company’s debt/equity ratio equals the book value of short- and
long-term debt divided by the market capitalization of common stock.  All values are reported in millions of dollars as of December
31 of each year.  Welch retired in September of 2001 and his compensation that year is not for a full 12 months.
Year Age
Cash
Salary +
Bonus
Equity
Awards
Pension
Increment
Total
Value of
Pension
Value of
Deferred
Comp.
Total
Inside
Debt
Total
Inside
Equity
CEO’s
Debt/Equity
Ratio
Company’s
Debt/Equity
Ratio
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
$4.0
$4.4
$5.3
$6.3
$8.0
$10.0
$13.3
$16.7
$16.0
$4.5
$4.9
$15.8
$6.6
$7.3
$37.1
$24.7
$106.1
$0.0
$3.9
$4.3
$3.2
$4.8
$8.4
$12.0
$18.0
$24.8
$19.1
$15.3
$15.5
$23.3
$32.5
$45.0
$61.6
$80.1
$114.1
$145.6
$0.8
$1.2
$3.7
$5.6
$8.6
$10.2
$12.7
$18.9
$24.8
$16.1
$16.7
$27.0
$38.1
$53.6
$71.8
$92.8
$133.0
$170.4
$120.0
$129.9
$223.1
$331.2
$632.6
$850.2
$1,263.1
$1,155.0
$639.4
0.13
0.13
0.12
0.12
0.08
0.08
0.07
0.12
0.27
1.81
1.09
0.96
0.80
0.60
0.52
0.40
0.42
0.59
Table II
Descriptive statistics
Descriptive statistics for variables related to CEO and firm characteristics for a sample of 1,659
observations from 237 Fortune 500 companies in the 1996-2002 period.  Pension actuarial values
are calculated based upon assumptions given in the text.  Equity value equals the value of
common stock plus stock options, calculated according to Black-Scholes methodology.  Cash
compensation is the value of annual salary and bonus.  Leverage equals total debt, both short-
and long-term, divided by total debt plus either the book value or market value of equity. 
Distance to default is the number of standard deviations decrease in firm value that would be
required for a firm to default on its debt, according to assumptions given in the text.  Distance to
default is not calculated for firms with market leverage below 1%.
CEO variables
Age
Pension indicator
Pension actuarial fair value (mm.)
Equity ownership value (mm.)
Pension value / equity value
Annual cash compensation (mm.)
Annual pension increment (mm.)
Annual change in pension (mm.)
CEO’s years as CEO
CEO’s years employed with firm
CEO outside hire indicator
CEO in founding family indicator
CEO percent ownership
Mean
57.2
0.77
$4.5
$416.3
0.18
$2.3
$1.0
$1.0
6.61
22.16
0.18
0.14
1.19%
Std. Dev.
6.9
$7.7
$3,192.9
0.35
$2.2
$2.0
$2.3
7.07
12.10
4.27%
25th %ile
53
$0.3
$16.0
0.01
$1.2
$0.0
$0.0
2
13
0.05%
Median
58
$2.7
$38.2
0.07
$1.8
$0.5
$0.4
4
23
0.11%
75th %ile
62
$5.7
$104.8
0.20
$2.7
$1.0
$1.3
9
32
0.31%
Firm variables
Total assets (bn.)
Net sales (bn.)
Return on assets (EBITDA)
Equity market capitalization (bn.)
Equity volatility
Leverage (market value of equity)
Leverage (book value of equity)
Research & development / sales
Distance to default
Tax loss carry-forward indicator
Zero-dividend indicator
Years since date of founding
Number of industry segments
Board size
Percent of outside directors
Institutional investor ownership
$36.5
$12.4
16.1%
$24.8
0.372
0.267
0.565
0.023
3.15
0.211
0.144
91.95
2.54
12.10
79.2%
61.1%
$88.9
$14.2
10.6%
$46.5
0.147
0.212
0.278
0.047
1.10
45.33
1.97
3.46
11.0%
14.9%
$4.8
$4.3
9.0%
$4.8
0.277
0.092
0.361
0
2.39
61
1
10
73.3%
51.0%
$12.0
$7.5
15.1%
$9.5
0.346
0.211
0.566
0
2.97
94
2
12
81.8%
62.6%
$29.3
$14.5
22.1%
$22.8
0.435
0.421
0.790
0.025
3.72
120
3
14
87.5%
72.1%
Table III
Mean values of elements of CEO compensation, by age
Descriptive statistics for variables related to CEO compensation and pensions for a sample of
1,659 observations from 237 Fortune 500 companies in the 1996-2002 period.  Increments to
pension actuarial values are calculated based upon assumptions given in the text.  Stock options
awards are valued according to Black-Scholes methodology as reported by ExecuComp.  All
dollar values are in millions.  In each column the annual pension increment is calculated based
upon fewer observations than the other variables, since it requires the use of year-over-year
differences in certain variables.
All
CEOs
Age
46-50
Age
51-55
Age
56-60
Age
61-65
Age
66+
Observations 1,656 175 385 509 423 104
Salary $0.9 $0.8 $0.9 $1.0 $1.0 $1.0
Bonus $1.4 $1.2 $1.3 $1.5 $1.6 $1.8
Stock option awards $5.8 $6.1 $6.0 $4.9 $5.1 $7.0
Restricted stock awards $0.9 $1.0 $0.7 $0.9 $0.9 $1.2
Long-term incentive payouts $0.5 $0.5 $0.4 $0.5 $0.8 $0.3
Annual increment to pension value $1.0 $0.4 $0.7 $1.1 $1.6 $0.8
Total compensation $10.6 $9.9 $10.0 $10.5 $10.9 $12.0
Change in pension / total comp. 0.10 0.04 0.08 0.11 0.15 0.04
Pension value / equity value 0.18 0.05 0.14 0.23 0.27 0.05
Fraction of CEOs for whom 
(pension value / equity value) > 
firm’s (debt value / equity value)
0.13 0.05 0.07 0.17 0.22 0.03
Table IV
Form and structure of CEO pensions
Incidence and structure of CEO pension plans in a sample of 1,659 observations from 237
Fortune 500 companies in the 1996-2002 time period.  The second section of the table is based
upon the 1,307 observations for firms whose CEOs have accrued non-zero pensions.   The lower
three sections of the table are calculated based upon 1,089 observations for which pensions are
calculated according to the widely used pay/service formula, which is the product of average
compensation times years employed times a multiplier factor.  The final section of the table
reports the payout currently earned by each CEO, not the payout that a CEO might expect to
receive if he worked until normal retirement age.
Type of CEO pension
Pay/service formula
Cash balance
Negotiated in employment contract
Pension frozen with terms from defunct plan
No pension
64%
7%
6%
1%
23%
Minimum retirement age for full pension benefits
55
60
62
65
Other
3%
11%
9%
76%
1%
Items included in calculation of average compensation
Salary
Bonus
Restricted stock awards (when vested)
Long-term incentive plan (when paid out)
100%
94%
4%
4%
Years compensation averaged to calculate annual payout
1
3
4
5
5%
39%
3%
54%
Fraction of final average compensation in annual payout
Less than 20.1%
20.1% - 30.0%
30.1% - 40.0%
40.1% - 50.0%
50.1% - 60.0%
60.1% - 70.0%
More than 70.0%
9%
9%
12%
23%
31%
14%
2%
Table V
Panel data Tobit estimates of ratio of CEO’s inside debt vs. inside equity holdings
Tobit regression estimates of the fair actuarial value of a CEO’s pension, and the ratio of pension
value over stock and option equity value.  Pension values are estimated using actuarial
assumptions given in the text.  Stock option values are based upon Black-Scholes calculations. 
Leverage equals total debt over total debt plus stockholders’ equity.  The dummy variable for
liquidity constrained firms equals 1 if the firm pays zero dividends.  The dummy variable for tax
status equals 1 if the firm has an operating loss carry-forward.  All between estimates are based
upon within-firm averages for 237 Fortune 500 firms in the 1996-2002 period.  Fixed effects
estimates are based upon 1,655 annual observations for these firms.  T-statistics appear in
parentheses below each estimate.
Dependent variable: CEO’s pension present value CEO pension present value ÷
value of (stock + options)
Firm 
fixed effects
CEO
fixed effects
Firm 
fixed effects
CEO 
fixed effects
CEO’s years employed by firm
CEO hired from outside firm (dummy)
Firm size (log of total assets)
Leverage (book value)
Liquidity constrained
(zero-dividend dummy)
Growth opportunities (R&D / sales)
Tax status (carry-forward dummy)
Years since founding of firm
0.297
(13.34)
4.968
(6.85)
1.620
(3.08)
-1.043
(0.98)
-0.207
(0.20)
-20.88
(1.50)
-0.710
(0.99)
0.436
(4.92)
***
***
***
***
0.205
(0.45)
0.553
(1.11)
-1.723
(1.69)
-1.521
(1.71)
-2.639
(0.20)
-0.503
(0.58)
1.224
(2.59)
*
*
***
0.008
(6.38)
0.022
(0.52)
-0.044
(1.49)
0.180
(2.97)
0.003
(0.05)
0.380
(0.47)
0.026
(0.73)
-0.001
(0.28)
***
**
0.000
(0.00)
-0.100
(3.37)
0.225
(3.73)
0.010
(0.19)
0.094
(0.12)
-0.007
(0.20)
0.020
(0.71)
**
***
Other regression controls: institutional ownership (%), log of board size, percent of outside
directors, CEO membership in founding family.
Significant at 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) levels.
Table VI
Logit estimates for CEO turnover as a function of pension compensation
Logistic regression estimates of the probability of CEO turnover.  The sample includes
observations for a panel of 237 Fortune 500 companies during the 1996-2002 period.  The
dependent variable equals 1 if the CEO leaves his position during the last half of the fiscal year
or the first half of the subsequent fiscal year.  The indicator for pension payable equals 1 if the
CEO has the right to immediate payout of his full pension, if any.  Excess stock return equals the
difference between the raw stock return and the CRSP value-weighted index, compounded
continuously.  T-statistics robust to serial correlation and heteroskedasticity appear below each
estimate in parentheses.
All
turnover
Forced
turnover
Planned
turnover
CEO Age
Pension payable indicator
Excess stock return
Excess stock return,
prior year
Member of founding family
CEO percentage ownership
Years tenure as CEO
Observations
Year dummy variables
Mean of dependent variable
% classified correctly
0.138
(6.04)
0.675
(2.43)
-0.836
(2.52)
-0.894
(2.70)
-1.194
(2.34)
-6.004
(1.86)
0.012
(0.77)
1,616
Yes
0.106
89.3%
***
**
***
***
**
*
0.001
(0.03)
-0.665
(0.75)
-1.812
(3.81)
-1.575
(2.89)
-0.549
(0.79)
0.589
(0.13)
0.010
(0.29)
1,616
Yes
0.029
97.0%
***
***
0.216
(6.59)
0.610
(2.04)
0.321
(0.76)
-0.192
(0.54)
-1.923
(2.54)
-7.691
(1.85)
0.011
(0.59)
1,616
Yes
0.077
92.0%
***
**
**
*
Other regression controls: institutional ownership (%), log of board size, percent of outside
directors, leverage (book value), market-to-book ratio.
Significant at 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) level.
Table VII
Adjustments to cash compensation when CEO foregoes pension
Panel data regression estimates of CEOs’ cash salary and bonus compensation.  The sample
consists of observations for 237 Fortune 500 firms in the 1996-2002 period.  Excess stock return
equals the difference between the raw stock return and the CRSP value-weighted index,
compounded continuously.  The forgone pension variable equals the annual pension that the
CEO would have received had he chosen to retire prior to the current fiscal year; for CEOs who
are younger than the age at which full pension benefits are paid, this variable equals zero.  T-
statistics appear in parentheses below each coefficient estimate.
Dependent variable:
Cash salary+bonus compensation
Firm fixed effects CEO fixed effects
Firm size (log of total assets)
Excess stock return, current year
Excess stock return, prior year
CEO age
CEO percentage ownership
Member of founding family
Foregone pension
542.92
(3.73)
1056.47
(7.66)
395.37
(2.74)
18.83
(1.42)
-742.05
(0.36)
532.57
(1.64)
0.46
(3.69)
***
***
***
*
***
498.21
(2.75)
1155.07
(7.34)
440.76
(2.77)
-10.03
(0.01)
6670.25
(1.17)
0.49
(3.22)
***
***
***
***
Firms
Observations
Year dummy variables
R2
237
1,655
Yes
0.593
237
1,655
Yes
0.641
Other regression controls: log of board size, institutional ownership (%), percent of outside directors,
years tenure as CEO, age of firm.
Significant at 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) levels.
Table VIII
Estimates of default risk as a function of CEOs’ inside debt and equity holdings
Fixed effects estimates of firms’ default risk.  Default risk is measured as the distance to default,
which equals the number of standard deviations of reduction in the market value of the firm that
would place it below the default barrier (a more complete definition appears in the text).  The
key explanatory variables utilize the CEO’s personal debt/equity ratio, which has the actuarial
fair pension present value in the numerator, and the market value of shares and options in the
denominator.  For the firm, the debt/equity ratio equals the book value of total debt over the
market value of common stock.  CEO pension fair value is calculated using assumptions given in
the text.  The number of industry segments, a measure of diversification, equals the number of
business units for which the company reports disaggregated line-of-business data in its annual
report.  The sample includes 1,659 observations for 237 Fortune 500 firms between 1996-2002,
and the regression omits firms with minimal amounts of debt outstanding.  T-statistics appear
below each estimate in parentheses.
Dependent variable: distance to default Firm
fixed effects
CEO
fixed effects
Firm
fixed effects
CEO
fixed effects
Firm size (log of total assets)
Leverage (book value)
Number of industry segments in firm
CEO’s pension value / 
CEO’s stock and option value 
Indicator for 
CEO’s pension/equity>firm’s debt/equity
0.024
(0.39)
-0.459
(3.62)
-0.003
(0.21)
0.139
(2.38)
***
**
0.122
(1.85)
-0.400
(2.73)
0.011
(0.74)
0.141
(1.97)
*
***
**
0.007
(0.12)
-0.282
(2.19)
-0.005
(0.39)
0.312
(5.45)
**
***
0.124
(1.90)
-0.203
(1.39)
0.007
(0.45)
0.436
(6.23)
*
***
Firms
Observations
Year dummy variables
R2
233
1,570
Yes
0.776
233
1,570
Yes
0.820
233
1,570
Yes
0.780
233
1,570
Yes
0.826
Other regression controls:  institutional ownership (%), log of board size, percent of outside directors, market-to-
book ratio.
Significant at 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) levels.
Table IX
Dividend payout rate as a function of CEOs’ inside debt and equity holdings
Panel Tobit regression estimates of the dividend payout rate.  The key explanatory variable in
each model is the value of the CEO’s pension, option, or stock ownership.  Each model also
includes a range of control variables listed at the bottom of the table.  The top half of the table
presents estimates with firm-specific intercept terms, while the bottom half presents estimates
with CEO-specific intercepts.  The dependent variable in all models has been multiplied by 103,
and all pension, option, and stock ownership is measured in millions of dollars.  Each estimation
uses 1,659 observations from 237 firms between 1996 and 2002.
Dependent variable: 
Dividends / market capitalization Firm fixed effects
Value of CEO’s pension
Value of CEO’s options
Value of CEO’s stock
-0.119
(2.19)
**
-0.028
(5.05)
***
0.0002
(1.31)
-0.069
(1.26)
-0.026
(4.73)
0.0002
(1.33)
***
CEO fixed effects
Value of CEO’s pension
Value of CEO’s options
Value of CEO’s stock
0.024
(0.41)
-0.017
(3.28)
***
0.0001
(0.63)
0.044
(0.75)
-0.018
(3.33)
0.0001
(0.68)
***
Other regression controls: return on assets (current year and one lag), firm size (log of assets),
growth opportunities (r&d / sales), institutional ownership (%), log of board size, percent of
outside directors, age of firm in years
Significant at 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) levels.
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Figure 1
Mean and median actuarial fair pension values for CEOs by age
Mean and median actuarial present values for pensions held by CEOs in a sample of 237 Fortune
500 companies in the 1996-2002 period, including zero-valued observations which comprise 23
percent of the 1,659 CEO-year observations.  Pension values are calculated based upon
assumptions given in the text, using information disclosed in company proxy statements.
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Figure 2
Annual CEO turnover rates by age, as a function of pension availability
Annual frequencies of voluntary CEO turnover at different ages within a sample of 237 Fortune
500 companies between 1996 and 2002.  The entire sample includes 1,659 annual observations,
but the chart is drawn from a subsample of 1,296 observations, excluding those CEO-years for
which no pension plan was in effect and also excluding cases of involuntary turnover.  The top
line shows turnover rates for CEOs who have reached or surpassed the age at which their
pensions become fully payable, comprising a total of 186 observations.  The lower line shows
turnover rates for CEOs who are younger than the pension payable age, a total of 1,100
observations.
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Figure 3
Debt rating upgrades and downgrades vs. CEO pension values
Annual frequencies of corporate debt rating upgrades and downgrades, plotted against the values
of CEOs’ pensions.  Within a sample of 237 Fortune 500 companies between 1996 and 2002. 
Although the entire sample consists of 1,659 company-year observations, the graph is based on
the subset of 909 observations for which CEOs have nonzero pensions and debt rating
information is available from either Standard & Poor’s or Moody’s.  CEO pension values
represent year-end fair actuarial present values of lifetime pension benefits earned by the CEO,
calculated according to assumptions given in the text.
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Figure 4
Capital investment vs. CEO pension values
Annual totals of corporate capital investment, plotted against the value of CEOs’ pensions within
a sample of 237 Fortune 500 companies between 1996 and 2002.  Although the entire sample
consists of 1,659 company-year observations, the graph is based on the subset of 1,307
observations for which CEOs have nonzero pensions.  CEO pension values represent year-end
fair actuarial present values of lifetime pension benefits earned by the CEO, calculated according
to assumptions given in the text.  Capital investment equals the sum of capital expenditures plus
research & development expense (if any), as reported by Compustat.
